1.
ERIK POUTSMA AND OTHERS: 13 FEATURES OF BEST PRACTICES (details)
The most complete summary of European features of best practices
was presented by Erik Poutsma and others in a Draft Report on
"Practices of financial participation in Europe - Features
of best practices" in September 2001. Other contributors
were: Eckhard Voss, Peter Wilke, Robert Tchobanian, Hiro Nohara,
Olivier Blacas, Karsten Kruger, Panu Kalmi, Erna Bruin, Fred Huijgen,
Andrew Pendleton. The Final Report will be published soon. The
following presentation is made by EFES on basis of the draft report:
WHAT ARE FEATURES OF EFFECTIVE SCHEMES? (based on pages
25 to 29 of the Draft Report)
What
are the features of effective schemes? What follows is a draft
outline of possible dimensions that influences the effectiveness
of schemes. We do this by highlighting the following:
·
The
objectives that are set including the alignment of interests
·
The
main actors and their participation in plan development and organization
and monitoring
·
The
relationship with participation in decision making
Before
to proceed with the features of best practices we must state that
effective schemes are conditional and that there is no universal
best scheme. Apart from differences due to country specific factors
there are also company specific factors that influence the type
of scheme. Most schemes can be tailored to the needs in a specific
situation. This means also that there is a dynamic in schemes
and that it should be allowed to change schemes in time. The next
features of effective schemes should be treated as domains for
discussion.
We defined effective as follows: Effective
schemes are those schemes that meets the objectives of identification
and alignment of interests, add on employee saving, influence
of employees as a stakeholder.
1. Principles of Alignment of interest
Financial participation is an incentive
and an acknowledgment of the value of employees for the company.
It increases identification and commitment. Our study made clear
that hard economic performance indictors are not the main objectives
of financial participation. It is about a sense of belonging and
ownership and not a guaranteed future reward.
For effective schemes we may conclude
that the promotion of these schemes should not be done by pressing
hard economic performance and hard economic returns but by stressing
identification and commitment
2. Primary objectives are identification and add on saving
The objectives of economic performance
and economic returns are enhanced through other practices that
is more or less related to performance related appraisal and pay.
In most cases there is some other measures taken to cover this
objective. In a number of cases stock options are used in this
sense. Actually this can also be used to develop clear reward
in a shorter term. Also there are companies that reward economic
performance with becoming shareholder or giving shares. The problem
with the use of financial participation schemes for enhancing
economic performance is that the relationship between individual
performance and the performance of the unit or organization may
not be that tied.
We may state that functional equivalent
practices to enhance economic performance and economic returns
can be developed within the domain of financial participation.
However, the rewards that accrue from these bare the risks that
they become zero or negative due to factors not influenced by
the performance of the person.
3. Plan development with employee representatives
In most cases the management or owner
takes the initiative to develop a plan. Of course this is important
to have the thing going anyway. Effective schemes appear to start
develop the plan in co-operation with employee representatives
and allow also to have a position in the trustee, fund or board
or whatever legal body that administer the plan.
Effective schemes are schemes that
is developed together with employee representatives and allow
representatives to have a position in the board or other legal
body that administer the scheme.
4. Collective schemes with voting rights
In some cases schemes are individual
schemes, that is, they are treated in an individual relationship
between employee and company. Most cases develop a kind of collective
plan in which there is a collective body that represent the employees
that take part in the scheme. These collective schemes have a
larger commitment effect due to a sense of solidarity than individual
types of plan.
Effective schemes are voluntary schemes
with a collective body that represents the employee participants.
5. Schemes are co-managed by employee shareholder representatives and other
stakeholders
Another main objective that companies
have is to offer an additional saving to employees, but at the
same time part of flexible remuneration. Also employees view financial
participation as long term additional savings that may become
a benefit in the end. Certainly by employees it is not considered
as part of wages. Therefore this raises the possibilities of conflict
between employer and employee. Companies tend to avoid this potential
conflict by carefully treating the schemes as typical additional
and by developing extensive consultation and co-management of
the scheme.
Effective schemes are schemes that
treat the reward from the schemes as additional, but risk baring,
saving. In order to treat it that way companies may develop co-management
structures for the organization and monitoring of the scheme.
6. Schemes allow for a fair distribution and allocation of shares
In most cases there is skew ness in
distribution. In most cases this is related to income and tenure.
However, to a certain extent this skew ness can be considered
is unfair. Apart from that there are also risks involved when
an individual puts much into one basket.
Effective schemes allow for a fair
skew ness in distribution and set maximum levels for contributions.
7. Participation in schemes is voluntary
In some cases there is an obligation
to take part in a collective scheme. This is viewed as not very
effective. Participation in schemes should be voluntary especially
when contributions are asked. Also, when shares are given for
free in an obligatory manner the identification by employees are
effective only in specific situations where there is clear relationship
between individual and collective performance.
Effective schemes are voluntary schemes
with some matching contribution by employees.
8. ESO is embedded in functional equivalent HR practices
The stated objectives of identification
and commitment are not solely coming from employee ownership.
Also this research showed that to be effective financial participation,
i.e. employee ownership, is part of a bundle of other practices
that intends to produce the same or related effects. There are
functional equivalent practices.
During the nineties, the focus of research
broadened to highlight the interrelationship of this typical human
resource-instrument to other bundles of HR-practices, like the
relation with human capital strategies, like corporate culture,
training- and development-plans, and ownership and control rights.
There are also interrelations with participative arrangements
in workplaces. It is said that this interrelationship produces-
combined with employee ownership- the best effect.
We may conclude that to raise the effectiveness
of schemes companies should develop functional equivalent human
resource practices.
9. ESO supported by broad communication and consultation practices on business
matters
Aligning interests is another result
that is achieved with the financial participation scheme. To reach
this companies develop, sometimes extensive, communication and
consultation concerning the annual budget and evaluation of performance.
These are valued as very necessary this goal.
Effective schemes are supported with
broad communication and consultation on business matters, more
specific, annual budgets and evaluation of past performance.
10. Parallel participative structures; layers of participation
The relationship with indirect participation
is important since share ownership suggest a role in the ownership
channel. In most cases it appears that employees has limited or
indirect voting rights. Only in smaller companies there may exist
a joint stock approach with one stock, one vote principle. As
mentioned earlier companies develop collective schemes with a
trustee or legal body that represents the employees in the meeting
of shareholders. In addition they develop parallel structures
for communication and consultation on evaluation of past performance
and annual budgets. This guarantees commitment in the decision
process and avoids any problems in the shareholders meeting. Also,
companies tend to have parallel structures for participation and
negotiations on labour terms and working conditions. These are
not directly related to employee share holding and subsequent
voting rights. Companies develop a division of issues to be handled
by the employee share holders representatives in the share holders
meeting and those issue to be handled by works councils or other
representatives.
Next, it appears that the line of command for operations does
not change or is hindered by the existence of the scheme.
In addition to that the relationship with daily operation is not
apparent other than there that should develop a higher commitment
to the work and organization. On the other hand the companies
develop structures for direct participation and consultation apparently
as a spin off of the more open communication and consultation
on business matters. These become part of functional equivalent
participation practices.
We may conclude that for an effective
scheme parallel structures can be developed that deals with participation
in decision making. We may conclude that the following structures
may be applied for the different functions they stand for (see
next scheme).
11. Well established internal market
In some cases problems arose with the
treatment of newcomers and the effect of employees leaving the
company. Plans that have solved this problem have well established
internal market and the administering body has a stock of shares
or other bonds or ways of financing to be able to be flexible
and to handle the dynamics.
Effective schemes have well established
internal market and have a body that is able to handle the dynamics
caused by newcomers and those leaving the company.
12. Schemes are evaluated and changed regularly
Our study showed that schemes go through
stages and life-cycles in which the objectives sometimes are met
and sometimes not. In general, there appears to be enthusiasm
in the first stages and gradually there come stages where the
scheme is a fact of life but does not influence identification,
commitment and alignment of interest anymore. Companies try to
avoid this through more communications and through changes in
the plan and try to sophisticate it. However, we may face the
possibility of closing down the plan when it is not effective
anymore. It appears that companies not always evaluate the effectiveness
of the plan. Share schemes are not a medicine for all evil. Employees
may become resistant to it.
Effective schemes are those schemes
that evaluate its working regularly and is able to change accordingly.
13. Training for financial participation
One of the main conditions for an effective
scheme is that employees know what it is and what the consequences
are to an employee owner. Given other functional equivalent measures
to promote commitment and identification and alignment of interest
with the ultimate aim of improvement of performance and entrepreneurship,
training of employees for participation is essential. This is
probably the main missing link in all less effective schemes.
The scheme and functional equivalent HR
measures can only be effective when employee owners are trained
for participation.
2.
THE BELGIAN PRINCIPLES FOR A LEGISLATION ON EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
IN CAPITAL AND IN ENTERPRISES PROFITS (as presented
in the Report of the Belgian group of experts)
At
the initiative of the European Commission, some general principles
have been formulated with which worker participation schemes must
comply. These principles originate in the two reports entitled
Pepper. They must thus form the basis for the Belgian legislation
in this connection, and may be summed up as follows:
•
The participation mechanism must be installed at the level
of the company. It must rest upon the voluntary participation
of the company (voluntary basis).
•
The participation mechanism must be the result of collective
consultation between the employer and the workers.
•
The mechanism is of a collective nature, in other words
it is accessible to all the workers in a company.
•
The participation mechanism must be based on a pre-established
formula where the link with the company’s results appears
clearly.
•
The participation does not replace the salary, it is an additional
income.
These
principles insist primarily on the fact that the setting up of
a worker participation mechanism must be done on a voluntary basis.
Companies are not obliged to set in place a financial participation
mechanism.
Secondly,
it is important to stress the collective aspect of the participation.
This participation must not be just the result of collective consultation;
it must, in addition, be open to all workers. The workers’ participation
must have a mobilising effect. It encompasses all workers because
the commitment of every individual is important. The participation
of the workers is thus not an instrument of individual motivation.
On this subject, there are other techniques, for example stock
options. The objective of worker participation is to stimulate
all workers so that they make a commitment to the company.
Thirdly,
worker participation calls for wide transparency in the management
of the company in such a way as to clearly reveal the link with
the company’s results. This principle immediately makes the link
with corporate governance. Companies which are well managed create
the confidence necessary for the smooth running, as should be
the case, of worker participation mechanisms.
Finally,
these principles insist on the fact that worker participation
can under no circumstances be a substitute for remuneration. Workers
are not company executives who have to carry the risks of this.
Workers must be able to benefit from their normal income when
the company’s results are less satisfactory.
The
Belgian group of experts group added two further principles to
those contained in the Pepper report:
• The advantages granted in the framework
of participation mechanisms which meet the conditions formulated
by the working group do not fall under the normal fiscal and quasi-fiscal
scheme applicable to remuneration. The working group has mapped
out the specific fiscal and quasi-fiscal scheme to which these
advantages will be subject.
•
Companies will be able to avail themselves of two participation
formulas: participation in capital and participation in profits.
Finally,
the Belgian group of experts defined a set of conditions requiring
to be met by the participation mechanisms in order to be able
to benefit from a specific fiscal and quasi-fiscal scheme:
Conditions requiring to be met by the participation
mechanisms in order to be able to benefit from a specific fiscal
and quasi-fiscal scheme
The
participation mechanisms offer a fiscal and quasi-fiscal advantage
which the authority is minded to grant. Accordingly, some essential
conditions have to be set so that these mechanisms can come into
consideration for the granting of these specific advantages. The
conditions set out below must be considered as the standards to
be complied with in order to obtain a ‘quality label’ giving entitlement
to the fiscal and quasi-fiscal advantages.
When
these conditions were drafted, the working group also took as
a guide the idea that the formal prescriptions applicable to the
participation mechanisms should be as flexible as possible. Otherwise,
the point is that the participation ceases to be attractive. The
method proposed to guarantee this flexibility consists of giving
companies sufficient freedom in the choice of a suitable participation
mechanism. The working group thus recognises that various models
of participation may be envisaged. The result must be that it
can satisfy small and medium-sized enterprises, expanding companies
and companies in recession equally. This is the only way to make
participation attractive for all companies.
The working group
has framed a series of conditions. Some of these conditions are
obvious and do not call for any long commentaries. This is not
the case with other conditions, which do need a commentary.
1. The initiative
to set up a participation mechanism lies with the management of
the company. This initiative is the subject of consultation in
the framework of the legal consultation bodies within the company.
In companies where such consultation bodies have not been set
up, although they should have been in accordance with the law,
it will first be necessary to set up these bodies before a participation
mechanism can be started up. In the absence of the consultation
bodies provided by the law, a consultation procedure will have
to be followed in line with the provisions laid down in the employment
regulations.
2.
This collective consultation must lead to the conclusion of a
specific company Collective Labour Agreement which gives concrete
shape to the formal conditions in the participation plan. In companies
traditionally outside the mechanism of company collective labour
agreements (companies with fewer than 50 workers and no union
delegation), workers will have to sign an act of accession which
will be submitted for the minister’s approval.
3.
The wage standard must be respected. This means that the financial
participation can be set in place only where the wage standard
has been exhausted. This condition gives concrete shape to the
principle that the participation cannot be a substitute for remuneration.
4.
The participation mechanism may be set up at the level of the
company or the group of which the company is part. If the participation
is set up at the level of the company, the profit statement must
be made under Belgian legislation on company accounting. If it
is at the group level, the ad hoc accounting standard on the consolidation
will be applied. In this case, only one collective labour agreement
will be concluded for all the Belgian subsidiaries of the group.
Certain companies are subsidiaries of a parent company. These
companies have to be able to opt for a participation plan of their
own, or for a plan applicable to all the Belgian subsidiaries
of the same group. This option makes it possible to promote staff
mobility between the subsidiaries of one group.
5.
A dual ceiling is provided:
•
The total advantages granted in the framework of the participation
mechanism may not exceed 10% of the total wage bill (gross remuneration)
of the company.
•
The total advantages granted in the framework of the participation
mechanism may not exceed 20% of the profits. ‘Profit’ here means
the profit in the accounting year to be allocated. (In the case
of a group, the figure to be used is the net result of the accounting
year).
The
advantages deriving from the participation mechanism are uncertain
and create risks for the workers. That is why it is necessary
to establish a ceiling to cap the extent of the participative
advantages with regard to remuneration.
6.
Every participation mechanism must be open to all the workers
in a company. The specific company collective labour agreement
will determine whether or not workers are compulsorily required
to be part of the participation mechanism. This condition is a
compromise between two ideas. The first idea is that the individual
workers must be free to decide whether or not to join the participation
mechanism set up by the company. The second school of thought
focuses on the collective aspect of the participation and lays
down the principle that all workers should participate when the
company decides to set up a participation mechanism. The compromise
lies in the idea that the employers and the workers decide in
the framework of their collective consultation whether membership
of the participation mechanism should be on a voluntary individual
basis or not.
7.
By a worker, we mean a salaried worker. No distinction is drawn
between limited-term contracts and unlimited-term contracts. The
company collective labour agreement may lay down a seniority condition.
8.
The advantages deriving from the participation mechanism are in
principle the same for all workers. The specific company collective
labour agreement may, however, make departures from this rule.
In such cases, only the remuneration may be taken as an objective
criterion for the distribution of the benefit, it being understood
that the maximum advantage may not be more than twice as high
as the lowest advantage. This condition is great influenced by
the idea that the participation is a collective affair. it constitutes
an instrument likely to mobilise all the members of the staff.
This may be best achieved by guaranteeing an egalitarian principle.
Larger and smaller players will all receive the same thing. This
sort of choice also maximises the likelihood that the participation
will be accepted both within and outside the company. This egalitarian
principle also allows the same contribution to be made by the
authority for every worker in the participation mechanism, in
the form of the fiscal and quasi-fiscal advantages granted. However,
the working group was of the opinion that a certain flexibility
in the application of this egalitarian principle was desirable.
9.
The advantages granted in the framework of the participation mechanism
can be in cash or in shares. The shares awarded must give their
holders the normal voting rights. The fiscal and quasi-fiscal
processing of the participation in the capital will be more attractive
than that which is applicable to advantages awarded in cash. The
working group proposes the following fiscal and quasi-fiscal processing:
•
The participative advantage constitutes part of the company’s
after-tax profit. Half of the corporation tax which is paid on
the share of the profit assigned to the participation mechanism
is allocated to social security.
•
If the participative advantage is allocated in cash to the worker,
the worker’s personal share to social security is payable. The
balance is subject to a levy of 25%.
•
If the participative advantage is allocated in shares, it is subject
to a levy of 15%.
Companies’
needs in terms of participation mechanisms may vary radically.
That is why there is a need to offer the greatest possible freedom
in the choice of the participation formula. In some companies,
there may be a preference for forms of direct cash allocation,
while in others, the preference will be for the allocation of
shares (participation in capital). Companies may also wish to
apply both forms of participation. The working group is of the
opinion that the specific fiscal and quasi-fiscal scheme must
be more advantageous vis-à-vis a participative advantage in shares
rather than in cash. The reason is that in the framework of a
participation in capital, workers are more closely involved in
the company and run more risks. In addition, the shares are blocked
for a set period (see condition 10 below).
10.
Where the participative advantage is allocated in the form of
shares, the specific company collective labour agreement sets
the period for which the shares are blocked. The law will determine
a minimum period. The point is that it is necessary, in the case
of an allocation in the form of shares, to avoid the latter being
immediately resold by the worker. In fact, in such a case, there
would no longer be any difference between this scheme and an allocation
in cash. That is why a period of blockage is indispensable. This
period must, however, not be too long, at the risk of making the
link between the results of the company and the advantage deriving
from them for the wage-earner too fleeting. The minimum duration
of blockage proposed is 2 years. Nevertheless, the company collective
labour agreement may provide for a longer period of blockage.
11.
The specific company collective labour agreement likewise lays
down whether the allocation of the participative advantage is
to be made via an intermediary structure (for example: participation
fund, co-operative society) or not. If an intermediary structure
is set up, the specific company collective labour agreement may
also stipulate that the workers may opt for the allocation of
the participative advantage via the intermediary structure or
for direct allocation. The right to vote within this intermediary
structure will follow the principle of 1 person/1 vote. The idea
underpinning this condition is that for certain companies (for
example SMEs, but not necessarily all SMEs), an intermediary structure
is indicated for the management of the workers’ participative
advantages in capital. For other companies, this is not necessarily
the case. The company needs to be able to position itself freely
depending on its own needs. The fiscal and quasi-fiscal processing
of these two forms of participation in capital must be neutral,
in other words it must not favour one form over the other.
12. The participation mechanisms may not
be set up to the detriment of employment. Neither must they have
the effect of modifying the company’s employment policy. That
is why the consultation which must take place within the company
ahead of the setting up of a participation mechanism must likewise
include a discussion on the employment policy. The conclusions
of that discussion must appear in the specific company collective
labour agreement. At the macro-economic level, the social partners
will regularly evaluate the impact of the participation mechanisms
on employment. There is a legitimate fear in some quarters that
participation may be used to force the readier acceptance by workers
of employment and restructuring measures. The company’s profits
after restructuring may in fact increase and therefore serve to
the benefit of those who remain. That is why it is necessary to
establish clearly, within the framework of the collective consultation
procedure, the extent to which the participation mechanisms will
have an influence on employment within the company.
The complete Report of the Belgian group of experts is available
on http://home.pi.be/~pin13904/DEGRAUWEEN.pdf
(English version) and on http://home.pi.be/~pin13904/DEGRAUWEFR.pdf
(French version).
3. EIGHT GENERAL PRINCIPLES WITHIN THE COMMUNICATION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (details)
The
overview of different forms of financial participation has shown
the great variety of financial participation schemes. At the same
time, there also exist a number of core elements and principles
which characterise most financial participation schemes and Member
States policies. The general principles identified here reflect
this basic consensus and can act as a reference point for the
identification of good practice. They should thus inspire the
promotion of financial participation schemes across Europe and
serve as a guideline for Member States, social partners and enterprises.
1. Voluntary
participation
Financial
participation schemes should be voluntary for both enterprises
and employees. The introduction of financial participation schemes
should meet the actual needs and interests of all parties involved,
and should therefore not be imposed. Obviously, this does not
preclude that some elements of financial participation are made
mandatory, or that financial participation is introduced on the
basis of legislation or collective agreements. Government support
programmes and the provision of a clear legal framework are important
elements in promoting the use of financial participation schemes.
The involvement of the social partners can also be a major factor
in making sure the success of financial participation.
2. Extending
the benefits of financial participation to all employees
Access
to financial participation schemes should in principle be open
to all employees. While a certain differentiation may be justified
in order to meet the different needs and interests of employees,
financial participation schemes should aim at being as comprehensive
as possible and treating employees on similar terms.
Among
the main benefits of employee financial participation are the
increased identification of employees, creating a feeling of belonging
and improving the motivation of staff. Any discrimination between
employees would run completely counter to these objectives and
should therefore be avoided.
3. Clarity
and transparency
Financial participation schemes
should be set up and managed in a clear and transparent way. This is important for the acceptance of such schemes
and allows employees to assess fully the possible risks and benefits
involved. Priority should be given to clear, comprehensible plans,
with an emphasis on the transparency for employees. In this relation
it is particularly important that employees or their representatives
are informed and consulted about the details of financial participation
schemes which are to be introduced.
Especially share-ownership schemes
will almost inevitably involve a certain complexity. In this case,
it is important to allow for adequate training for employees to
enable them to assess the nature and details of the scheme in
question.
Schemes
should also be managed in a transparent way. Enterprises should
strictly adhere to existing accounting standards and disclosure
rules. In addition employees should receive regular information
and should be informed about any developments which may have a
major impact on their investment.
4. Predefined
formula
Rules
on financial participation in companies should be based on a predefined
formula clearly linked to enterprise results. This is a major
element in ensuring the transparency of such schemes. Also with
view to the motivation, commitment and identification of staff
it will obviously be preferable to adopt a clear and predefined
formula rather than decide on any profit-sharing scheme only ex-post.
5. Regularity
Financial participation
schemes should be applied on a regular basis and should not be
a one-off exercise. This is particularly important if such schemes
are aimed at enhancing and rewarding the long-term commitment
and loyalty of staff. It is obvious that this regularity in the
application of schemes does not imply that the benefits derived
from them remain stable over time. It lies in the nature of financial
participation schemes that the bonuses received will vary depending
on enterprise results and profits and that in some years no bonuses
will be paid at all or that there may be a fall in the value of
employees’ investments.
6. Avoiding
unreasonable risk for employees
Compared
to other ‘investors’ employees tend to be more exposed to adverse
economic developments affecting their enterprise. For them, it
is not only their investment that is at stake, but potentially
also their income and their job itself.
The extent to which financial participation
schemes involve risks for employees depends, however, on the details
of each scheme. In general, cash- or fund-based schemes are likely
to involve only limited risks. Also in relation to share-ownership
plans possible risks for employees depend to a large extent on
the details of each plan, including for example the length of
any retention period, provisions concerning an earlier sale of
shares, or ceilings on the amounts that can be invested.
Given
the potential risks for employees involved, due consideration
should in any case be given in the introduction and running of
financial participation schemes to the avoidance of any unreasonable
risks. At the very least, employees have to be warned of the risks
of financial participation resulting from fluctuations in income
or from limited diversification of investments. As set out above,
financial participation schemes should also be introduced and
managed in a clear and transparent way. When designing financial
participation schemes, consideration should be given to develop
mechanisms or to give priority to such schemes, which avoid excessive
risks for employees taking into account the objectives pursued
with the respective scheme.
7. Distinction
between wages and salaries and income from financial participation
schemes
A
clear distinction has to be made between income from financial
participation on the one hand and wages and salaries on the other.
In some specific cases (for example for top executives or in the
case of start-up firms) income from financial participation, and
in particular stock options, may constitute an important part
of the overall remuneration. In general, however, financial participation
cannot be a substitute for pay and fulfils different, complementary
roles. Any income from financial participation should therefore
be paid in addition and above a fixed wage, which is determined
according to national rules and practices. In this respect, social
partners can of course bargain over pay and terms of financial
participation as they see fit.
8. Compatibility with worker mobility
Financial
participation schemes should be developed in a way that is compatible
with worker mobility both internationally and between enterprises.
Policies towards financial participation in particular should
avoid creating barriers to the international mobility of workers.
One
of the main objectives of financial participation obviously is
to enhance the long-term commitment and loyalty of employees to
their enterprise. However, at the same time more and more employees
are faced with increased demands for mobility and flexibility
in working life. Adequate provisions that take into account both
the company’s interest in a long-term commitment of their employees
and the employees’ right to mobility should therefore be made
in the design of financial participation schemes for dealing with
any problems resulting from a termination of contracts.
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